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PAYMENT FOR REPURCHASED SHARES UNDER THE
TEXAS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
by
Robin P. Hartmann* and Robert E. Wilson**
A PLETHORA of laws regulates a corporation's repurchase of its own
shares. For instance, federal securities laws, like some blue sky laws, seek
to prevent fraud and to provide full and fair disclosure in a corporation's
share repurchases;' federal income tax laws prevent a bail-out of earnings and
profits at lower capital gains rates in redemptions of shares which involve
distributions essentially equivalent to a dividend;' and federal banking laws
prohibit national banks from purchasing their own shares except to prevent
loss on debt previously contracted in good faith.' In addition, common-law
equitable standards restrict the power of a corporation to purchase its own
shares in certain types of transactions.' Supplementing these legislative and
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Corporate purchases of its own shares received its first attention under the federal se-
curities laws under rule 10b-5 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972). See generally A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-
SEC RULE 10b-5, S 7.3(3), at 158 (1971). Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 in 1968 (the Williams Bill) added new § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970),
which deals specifically with corporate repurchases of shares. See generally Israels, Limita-
tions on the Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares, 22 Sw. L.J. 755, 762 (1968). Other
securities laws affecting purchases by a corporation of its own shares include: rule 10b-2
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-2 (1970) (prohibiting
solicitation of purchases on an exchange to facilitate a distribution); rule 10b-6 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1972) (prohibition against trad-
ing by persons interested in a distribution); rule 10b-7 under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1972) (prohibition against stabilization of the market
to facilitate a distribution); and S 23 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
80a-23 (1970).
With regard to blue sky laws, few states have securities laws specifically restricting
repurchases of shares, but presumably the anti-fraud provisions of these state securities laws
would apply to these transactions. However, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c) (1965)
for one of the few blue sky laws dealing with share repurchases. Some states have rescission
statutes which cut off civil liabilities under prescribed conditions. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-33.C (1964).
Consider whether a Texas corporation could make a rescission offer under Texas Se-
curities Act § 33 if it did not have sufficient surplus under TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.03 (1956).
Corporations that engage in investment banking or in the brokerage business may be
subject to further restrictions if they are members of self-regulatory securities organizations.
N.Y. STOCK EXCH. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (g), and the rules thereunder, provide that member
firms must redeem or convert common stock held by a "principal stockholder" if the Ex-
change withdraws approval of that shareholder. A serious question is whether mandatory
conversion is permissible for a Texas brokerage firm under TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.12 (1956).
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302. The word "purchase" must be distinguished from
the word "redemption." A redemption is a form of a purchase consummated in accordance
with retirement provisions in the articles of incorporation. A purchase is much broader in
nature. This Article is not concerned with redemptions, but solely with arms-length publicly
or privately negotiated purchases. Ironically, the word "redemption" under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 includes all types of "purchases."
3 12 U.S.C. § 83 (1970).
1 Federal and state courts impose equitable limitations on the power of a corporation
to purchase its own shares in order to prevent and, if necessary, to remedy fraud, misrep-
resentation, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. See, e.g., Sanford v. First Nat'l Bank,
238 F. 298 (8th Cir. 1917); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960).
Most equitable limitations are directed at restricting overreachings by management and
insiders; bailing-out favored shareholders (1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW & PRAC-
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judicial limitations, individuals and corporations are permitted reasonable
control over a corporation's acquisition of its own shares!
The most frequently encountered limitations on share repurchase trans-
actions are the financial requirements imposed by modern state business cor-
poration acts. The paradigm for these codifications, the Model Business Cor-
poration Act (Model Act), confines routine repurchases of shares to acquisi-
tions out of earned surplus, although amounts of capital surplus and stated
capital may be used on certain occasions or to accomplish designated purposes.!
These financial prerequisites, deliberately tailored to parallel the financial re-
quirements imposed upon the payment of dividends7 and upon distributions in
partial liquidation,8 find their viability in statutory sanctions for transactions
outside the stringently prescribed legal funds.!
When proposed as a part of the modern business corporation acts in the
1950's, this scheme of regulating corporate repurchases of shares by the use
of financial requirements armed with remedial support was the subject of
harsh criticism from the majority of legal scholars, who desired more prophy-
lactic statutes." However, since adoption by a number of states" which have
followed the Model Act, this scheme has garnered minimal criticism because it
has met "the needs of corporate management for efficiency and flexibility,
while at the same time safeguard[edl the interests of shareholders, of creditors,
and of the public."" Though working satisfactorily most of the time, some
peculiar problems have arisen from court construction of these share re-
purchase statutes.
The application of these statutes to the transaction in which the purchase
TICE 5 495 (1959)); purchasing shares of minority shareholders for abusive reasons (State
v. Miller-Wohl Co., 42 Del. 73, 28 A.2d 148 (Super. Ct. 1942)); manipulating market
prices (Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)); purchasing stock of minority
shareholders to favor insiders on liquidation (Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d
Cir. 1947)); and maintaining equality of opportunity to sell shares to the corporation
(Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 396 Pa. 320, 152 A.2d 894 (1959)).
IContractual limitations may be found in articles of incorporation, bylaws, senior se-
curities, and loan agreements. These limitations must be reasonable. See, e.g., Ling & Co. v.
Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 470 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), rev'd, 482
S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972), noted in 50 TEXAS L. REV. 528 (1972). See generally 2 F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.08 (1958).
6 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6, 5 1 (2d ed. 1971).
'See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.38 (1956).
"See, e.g., id. art. 2.40.
'See, e.g., id. art. 2.41.
"Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CALIF.
L. REV. 465 (1931); Dodd, Jr., Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own
Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 697 (1941); Glenn, Treasury Stock, 15
VA. L. REV. 625 (1929); Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock, 15 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1930); Nussbaum, Acquisition by a Corporation of Its Own Stock, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 971 (1935); Wormser, The Power of a Corporation To Acquire Its Own Stock,
24 YALE L.J. 177 (1915).
"While there are no jurisdictions which have provisions identical to the Model Act,
two states have statutes identical in substance, and seventeen other states have statutes
comparable to the provisions of the Model Act. See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 6, 5 3 (2d ed. 1971). There can be little doubt that the Model Act has influenced
corporate statutes in all states. See Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation
Laws, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 637 (1959-60), for an excellent analysis of the Model Act
and its adherents.
"Foreword by Dean Page Keeton, in SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF COR-




price of shares is evidenced by a promissory note of the repurchasing corpora-
tion or when the purchase price is deferred or payable in installments has
spawned litigation, which in turn has produced problems for the corporation,
for creditors, and for shareholders. For example, court decisions have interpreted
statutes like article 2.03 of the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA) as
requiring the repurchase of shares only with cash or tangible assets which must
leave the corporation at a time when surplus exists equal to the purchase
price." The contingency of future surplus adequate to satisfy this construction
of statutes akin to article 2.03 is tantamount to the elimination of corporate
evidences of indebtedness as consideration for a corporation's repurchase of
its own shares. In this cashless age where sophisticated corporate finance often
dictates high leverage, the preference for cash over debt transactions seems
an anachronism, and puts states with statutes similar to article 2.03 at a dis-
advantage in attracting and competing for new corporate residents. Moreover,
this construction (that repurchased shares are paid for only when cash leaves
the corporation at a time when surplus exists equal to the purchase price)
carried to its logical extreme, appears to cause article 2.03 of the TBCA to be
inconsistent with provisions of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 4
Adding even more confusion, this obscure inconsistency and awkard preference
is encouraged by article 2.16(B) of the TBCA," but hindered by article
2.03 (E) of the TBCA. " These contradictions and outdated preferences can only
be eliminated by remedial legislation.
I. THE No PREJUDICE RULE AND THE INSOLVENCY CUTOFF
The present treatment of purchases by a corporation of its own shares de-
veloped in two stages. Initially, the question was: may a corporation lawfully
purchase its own shares? An affirmative, 7 though not unanimous," response
led to the next question: when-or to what extent-may a corporation law-
fully purchase its own shares? Before the modern business corporation acts, a
hodgepodge of vague phrases such as "no prejudice to the rights of creditors,"
"ultra vires transactions," and "impairment of capital" served as nebulous
guidelines for determining when repurchase transactions were lawful. Of these
ephemeral judicial standards, the no prejudice rule became the popular
view.'9
Determining exactly when a repurchase transaction becomes prejudicial to
creditors is not easy, but it is essential to an understanding of judicial interpre-
"Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
1
4 See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(44) (1968). See also note 42 intra.
".TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.16(B) (1956) provides that the issuance of a
promissory note does not constitute payment for shares of a corporation.
16 d. art. 2.03(E) provides that the surplus restriction requirement is dissolved by
cancellation of the repurchased shares without regard to the form of payment used to ac-
quire the shares.
"Early American authority decided that a corporation may acquire its own shares in
exchange for debt due it. Ex parte Holmes, 5 Cow. 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
"STrevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887), established the English rule, which
exists to date, that an English corporation cannot purchase its own shares. The reasoning
of that decision was simple: the court could find no legitimate reason for a corporation's
purchasing its own stock.




tations of share repurchase sections found in state business corporation acts. The
basic rule was that once a corporation became insolvent, a repurchase of shares
was no longer permissible, since the payment for worthless shares invariably
involved a fraudulent conveyance of the assets which were used to make pay-
ment.' Undoubtedly, the exchange of valuable assets for worthless shares
worked to the prejudice of creditors' rights. The no prejudice rule did not,
however, reach repurchases consummated while the corporation was solvent,
even when the repurchase impaired the capital of the corporation or was fol-
lowed closely by insolvency." In a nutshell, the rule minus the exceptions left
the critical determination of the legality of share repurchases dependent upon
two factors: the date of insolvency and the date of repurchase. If the repurchase
preceded insolvency, the transaction was lawful, while if repurchase followed
insolvency, it was illegal.
Application of this seemingly arbitrary rule faltered, however, when the
payment of the purchase price was deferred, payable in installments, or evi-
denced by a promissory note. "Was the critical time when the repurchase
agreement was executed, or the date on which the price was due?""2 Most
courts took the position that the result should not be different merely because
the purchase price was deferred, payable in installments, or evidenced by a
promissory note, rather than initially paid in a lump sum. Solvency at the
date of payment (when assets left the corporation to pay the deferred price,
an installment, or the promissory note) was a condition precedent, and any
payment on a repurchase obligation or promissory note after insolvency was
regarded as fraudulent and prejudicial. This reasoning is best illustrated in the
Fifth Circuit decision in Robinson v. Wangemann:
Arthur Wangemann loaned no money to the corporation. The note he ac-
cepted for his stock did not change the character of the transaction nor did the
renewals have that effect. A transaction by which a corporation acquires its
own stock from a stockholder for a sum of money is not really a sale. The
corporation does not acquire anything of value equivalent to the depletion of
its assets, if the stock is held in the treasury, as in this case. It is simply a
method of distributing a proportion of the assets to the stockholder. The assets
of a corporation are the common pledge of its creditors, and stockholders are
not entitled to receive any part of them unless creditors are paid in full. When
such a transaction is had, regardless of the good faith of the parties, it is
essential to its validity that there be sufficient [excess of assets over liabilities]
... to retire the stock, without prejudice to creditors, at the time payment is
made out of assets. In principle, the contract between Wangemann and the
corporation was executory until the stock should be paid for in cash. It is
immaterial that the corporation was solvent and had sufficient [excess of
assets over liabilities) . . .to make payment when the agreement was entered
into. It is necessary to a recovery that the corporation should be solvent and
have sufficient [excess of assets over liabilities] . . .to prevent injury to credi-
tors when the payment is actually made. This was an implied condition in the
original note and the renewals accepted by Arthur Wangemann.'
"Boggs v. Fleming, 66 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1933); Barden v. A. Heller Sawdust Co.,
240 Mich. 549, 215 N.W. 364 (1927).21 Herwitz, supra note 19, at 306.
"Id. at 307.
2375 F.2d 756, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1935).
[Vol. 26
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Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., one of the few cases not agreeing with the
reasoning of Robinson, contains equally logical arguments to the contrary:
[O1n reason and authority the conclusion seems inescapable that a cor-
poration may purchase shares of its own stock, for 'legitimate corporate pur-
poses,' and may, instead of paying cash therefor, issue its obligation payable
at a future date, and that the vendor holding such obligation becomes forth-
with a creditor, instead of a stockholder, of the -company and entitled to rank
equally with other creditors in the event of subsequent insolvency of the com-
pany, provided that at the time of the purchase the company has sufficient
assets to pay its creditors in full and provided the purchase is not made in
disregard of the equitable rights of other stockholders.'
The Wolff argument was convincing to few. Most courts followed the
reasoning of Robinson, viewing a contract to repurchase shares, insofar as the
corporation was concerned, as executory until cash was received for those
shares. The concern to creditors and other shareholders was the time the
assets left the corporation, since that was when the concomitant reduction in
protection occurred. Therefore, payment for the shares occurred when the
assets left the corporation, not when the contract was executed or when the
promissory note was issued. As a result, the shareholder who resold his shares
to the corporation in exchange for a promissory note received that note sub-
ject to automatic subordination to all other claims against the corporation upon
the corporation's subsequent insolvency; or, if he received a deferred payment
obligation, he had contracted to receive payment for the shares if, but only if,
the corporation remained solvent. In sum, prior to enactment of the modern
business corporation acts, the date of insolvency was the cutoff between lawful
and unlawful purchases by a corporation of its own shares, and payment for
repurchased shares meant the time cash or tangible assets actually left the
corporation.
II. MODERN BUSINESS CORPORATION ACTS--THE SURPLUS LIMITATION
With the movement for modernization of corporate laws came the heated
argument over the handling of a corporation's acquisitions of its own shares.
Two schools of thought evolved: (1) the paternalistic view that at common
law management's almost free rein to have a corporation repurchase its own
shares allowed abuse of unwitting creditors and shareholders, and, therefore,
that the scope of legitimate repurchases must be exactly defined in prophylac-
tic statutes; and (2) the remedial approach, which restricted management's
scope of discretion to have a corporation repurchase its own shares by pro-
viding remedies for purchases in violation of prescribed standards. Adherents
to the paternalistic view thought creditor and shareholder protection could
be attained only by confining the discretion of management and insiders to
repurchases solely out of earned surplus.' Some even wanted to enumerate
the exact circumstances under which the power of repurchase could be used,
-112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140, 141 (Ch. 1932).25 See note 10 supra. See also Blackstock, A Corporation's Power To Purchase Its Own
Stock and Some Related Problems, 13 TEXAs L. REV. 442 (1935); Comment, The Power
of a Corporation To Purchase Its Own Stock and Some Related Problems, 30 MARQ. L.
REv. 138 (1946).
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thereby completely eliminating the potential danger to creditors and share-
holders.'M Those supporting this approach seemed to presume unscrupulous
and overreaching management, and situations where insiders would take ad-
vantage of more liberalized statutes to eliminate minority shareholders, to
bail-out favored shareholders at the first glimmer of trouble, to compromise
debts to insiders, to siphon off assets of the corporation, and to accomplish
other self-dealing ends.
Supporters of the remedial procedure viewed this protective approach as
unnecessarily dispensing with a variety of share repurchase transactions which
are prompted by legitimate business purposes and circumstances." In any event,
they argued, equity prevents, to the same extent as a paternalistic statute, over-
reaching by insiders.
The compromise struck was to upgrade the no prejudice rule (or insolvency
cutoff test) to a surplus cutoff, which required that all purchases by a corpora-
tion of its own shares be out of surplus. Repurchases out of earned surplus
are permitted for any legitimate corporate purpose, and other amounts of
surplus would be available under prescribed conditions.
Article 2.032" of the TBCA is typical of the compromise. It allows a corpora-
" Kessler, supra note 11.
2 See Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 147.02, at 807 (1965).
2 8 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03 (1956) reads as follows:
A. A corporation shall not purchase directly or indirectly any of its own
shares unless such purchase is authorized by this Article and not prohibited
by its articles of incorporation.
B. A corporation may purchase its own shares to the extent of the aggre-
gate of any unrestricted surplus available therefor and its stated capital when
the purchase is authorized by the directors, acting in good faith to accomplish
any of the following purposes:
(1) To eliminate fractional shares.
(2) To collect or compromise indebtedness owed by or to the cor-
poration.
(3) To pay dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their shares
under the provisions of this Act.
(4) To effect the purchase or redemption of its redeemable shares in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
C. Upon resolution of its board of directors authorizing the purchase and
upon compliance with any other requirements of its articles of incorporation,
a corporation may purchase its own shares to the extent of unrestricted
earned surplus available therefor if accrued cumulative preferential dividends
and other current preferential dividends have been fully paid at the time of
purchase.
D. Upon resolution of its board of directors and vote of the holders of at
least two-thirds of all shares of each class, voting separately, authorizing the
purchase and upon compliance with any other requirements of its articles of
incorporation, a corporation may purchase its own shares to the extent of the
aggregate of unrestricted capital surplus available therefor and unrestricted
reduction surplus available therefor.
E. To the extent that earned surplus, capital surplus or reduction surplus
is used as the measure of the corporation's right to purchase its own shares,
such surplus shall be restricted so long as such shares are held as treasury
shares, and upon the disposition or cancellation of any such shares the re-
striction shall be removed pro tanto as to all of such restricted surplus not
eliminated thereby.
F. In no case shall a corporation purchase its own shares when there is a
reasonable ground for believing that the corporation is insolvent, or will
be rendered insolvent by such purchase or when, after such purchase, the fair
value of its total assets will be less than the total amount of its debts.
G. An open-end investment company, registered as such under the Federal
Investment Company Act of 1940, as heretofore or hereafter amended, if
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tion to acquire its own shares to the extent of the available:
(a) earned surplus, to accomplish any legitimate purpose, but only if
the articles of incorporation permit repurchases and if accrued cumulative
preferential dividends have been fully paid; or
(b) capital surplus and reduction surplus, for any legitimate purpose,
but only if two-thirds of all shares of each class of stock approve such
acquisition; or
(c) capital surplus and stated capital, in four isolated instances.
Also qualifying any repurchase is the requirement that the corporation be
solvent in the equity sense and the bankruptcy sense at the time of repurchase."9
Thus, the drafters of the modern business corporation acts raised the standards
prerequisite to a lawful purchase by a corporation of its own shares-the in-
solvency cutoff became the surplus cutoff. The question was no longer whether
the corporation was solvent at the time it purchased its own shares, but
whether the corporation had sufficient surplus at the time it purchased its
own shares.
A problem arose with the application of the surplus cutoff statute in the
situation where the purchase price was deferred, payable in installments pur-
suant to a contract, or evidenced by a promissory note. Should the surplus
test be applied at the time the promissory note was issued in exchange for
the repurchased shares, or at the time cash left the corporation to liquidate the
promissory note? Should the surplus test be applied to each installment pay-
ment as it becomes due under the contract, or to the aggregate purchase price
at the time of execution of the repurchase agreement? Undoubtedly, the
common-law insolvency cutoff rule would apply at the time cash left the
corporation; that is, when the promissory note became due or an installment
payment accrued. Arguably, the statutory surplus test should be imposed at
the same point in time unless some overriding policy dictated otherwise.
Regretfully, the court decisions since the passage of the modern state business
corporation acts have failed to consider whether or not sufficient reasons exist
to apply the statutory surplus limitations and the common-law insolvency test
its articles of incorporation shall so provide, may purchase, receive, or other-
wise acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer, or otherwise dispose of its own
shares, out of stated capital or any unrestricted surplus.
29MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 2(n) (2d ed. 1971) and TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 1.02(16) (1956) both define "insolvency" to mean "the inability of a corpora-
tion to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of its business." However,
Texas' repurchase of shares statute contains a phrase not found in the Model Act, namely,
"in no case shall a corporation purchase its own shares when . . . the fair value of its total
assets will be less than the total amount of its debts." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.03(F) (1956). As the Supreme Court has held, "[I]nsolvency in the equity sense has
always meant an inability of the debtor to pay his debts as they mature. Under the Bank-
ruptcy Act it means an insufficiency of assets at a fair valuation to pay debts." Finn v.
Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 303 (1945). Thus, while the TBCA requires solvency both in the
equity sense and the bankruptcy sense, the Model Act requires solvency only in the equity
sense. Maryland and North Carolina also incorporate both insolvency tests into their sur-
plus statutes. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 32(c) (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(e)
(1965).
Why Texas, Maryland, and North Carolina use insolvency both in the equity sense and
in the bankruptcy sense to limit repurchases is unexplained. A corporation with surplus
can be insolvent in the equity sense, but can a corporation have a surplus if it is insolvent
in the bankruptcy sense? See Kessler, supra note 11, at 666 n.93.
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at different times. Usually, though not always, the courts selected the easier
alternative and imposed the two tests at the same time.
For example, in Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner" the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a West Virginia corporate
statute, which prohibited the use of corporate funds for the purchase of the
corporation's shares if such a purchase would cause any impairment of the
corporation's capital, required that each installment of the purchase price for
reacquired shares be covered by surplus as that installment accrued. It was im-
material whether the corporation had surplus equal to or in excess of the total
purchase price on the date of execution of the repurchase contract and sur-
render of the purchased shares. "In effect, the Mountain State holding means
that an installment repurchase transaction is to be treated as if the successive
installments constituted a series of independent repurchase transactions, each
of which is to be tested separately under the [surplus cutoff test]."'"
Similarly, the court in In re Mathews Const. Co."' was concerned with the
validity of a promissory note, issued by a California corporation as partial
consideration for the acquisition of some of its own shares, under a corporate
statute similar to article 2.03 of the TBCA. At the time the promissory note
was issued in 1949, the financial requirements of the California statute were
satisfied, but bankruptcy intervened in 1952 and thereafter there was no sur-
plus. Citing both the California surplus statute and an insolvency cutoff case,
the court held the note was unenforceable because: "Bankruptcy having inter-
vened, obviously there can be no surplus from which payment for repurchased
stock may be made."" In effect, the Mathews decision means that the statutory
surplus requirements apply at the same time as the common law insolvency
test-which is at the time assets physically leave the corporation and not
when the promissory note is issued in exchange for the shares. Moreover,
issuance of a negotiable promissory note in the purchase by a California cor-
poration of its own shares is not "payment" since the shares are not paid for
until the promissory note is paid. The Mountain State and Mathews decisions,
both of which involved construction of statutory surplus requirements, indis-
criminately followed the reasoning of the 1935 Robinson opinion, which in-
volved the common-law insolvency cutoff test.
On the other hand, in the Minnesota case of Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing
Co.' the court was faced with the construction of a surplus statute, but there
the court followed the reasoning of the Wolff decision. A shareholder had
sold his shares to the corporation for a promissory note secured by chattel
mortgages. The court, giving great weight to the fact that the promissory note
was secured, concluded that the "corporation having had adequate surplus
funds on the date the agreement was made [and the promissory note issued]
to cover the entire purchase price of the stock, the liens of the chattel mort-
gages were not affected by the subsequent depletion of corporate surplus."'
30284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
"Herwitz, sapra note 19, at 304.
88120 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
33 1d. at 821.




Thus, the surplus requirements of the Minnesota statute were applied on the
date of execution of the repurchase agreement and issuance of the promissory
note, not on the date the assets left the corporation. Tracy clearly held that the
issuance of a secured promissory note was payment for the repurchased shares.
At this point it does not appear firmly settled whether the statutory surplus
requirements, as they apply to purchases by corporations of their own shares
where the purchase price is paid in installments or deferred pursuant to a
contract or evidenced by a promissory note, must be applied at the outset to
the total purchase price, or at some later date when cash leaves the corporation.
Admittedly, the construction adopted by Mountain State and Mathews has the
upper hand, but these decisions are not very persuasive since they have not
considered the consequences which follow this application, let alone any
alternative interpretations. Since quite disparate consequences result from appli-
cation of the surplus statute at the outset as opposed to application when cash
leaves the corporation, careful consideration must be given to determine which
application is the fairest for all those concerned.
III. SURPLUS REQUIREMENTS OF THE TBCA
Article 2.03 of the TBCA provides that a corporation may purchase its own
shares only when there is sufficient surplus, and that in no event shall a cor-
poration purchase its own shares when there are reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the corporation is insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by such
purchase. Obviously the proper application of the surplus limitation of article
2.03 is on the date the corporation purchases its own shares. But regretfully,
the term "purchase" is not defined in the TBCA. Purchase could be deemed to
be (1) at the outset when a repurchase contract is executed or a promissory
note is issued in exchange for the shares, or (2) at some later point in time
when cash leaves the corporation pursuant to the repurchase contract or to
pay the note at maturity. Without a statutory definition, the issue should be
decided by considering the intent of the drafters of the statute and after con-
trasting the merits of each application.
Since the drafters of the TBCA wisely borrowed heavily from the Model
Act, the intent of the Model Act architects often gives a helpful clue to the
proper interpretation to be given a TBCA section. Such a hint comes from a
1957 amendment to the Model Act, which to date has not been adopted as
a part of the TBCA. This amendment clarified the term "purchase" to refer
to the time a repurchase of shares contract is executed or promissory note is
issued in exchange for shares, rather than the date cash leaves the corporation
pursuant to the contract or to pay the promissory note. That amendment to
the Model Act added the words "or payment for" to the insolvency cutoff test.
The Model Act section now provides, in part, that:
A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise
acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares,
but purchases of its own shares . . . shall be made only to the extent of un-
reserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor . . . [and if certain




No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when
the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make
it insolvent. 6
Professor Herwitz views this change as an intentional effort by the drafts-
men to distinguish prerequisites to "payments" from prerequisites to "pur-
chases." The draftsmen understood that the term "purchase" and the term
"payment" would apply to the insolvency cutoff provision, but by making no
change in the surplus restrictions, they intended that only "purchases" and not
"payments" be covered by the surplus provisions. In other words, a corporation
must be solvent and have a surplus on the date it purchases its own shares, and
must be solvent, though it need not have a surplus, on the date of payment for
the shares."[A]ccordingly, the inference is well nigh irresistible that the surplus
test is to be applied to the total repurchase obligation at the outset [when the
agreement is executed or a note exchanged for shares], and not to any sub-
sequent payments as they are made [pursuant to the agreement or to pay
the promissory note]."37
Since the TBCA is based on the Model Act, some weight must be given
to the intent of the framers of the Model Act, which was to have the surplus
limitations apply at the outset when shares are surrendered in exchange for
value from the corporation, rather than on the date cash leaves the corporation
as payment. However, the scales are evenly balanced if the Texas Legislature's
inaction in failing to adopt the 1957 change to the Model Act has been in-
tentional. This is unlikely since some support for Professor Herwitz's argument
can be implied from the TBCA. Article 2.03(E) provides that:
To the extent that earned surplus, capital surplus or reduction surplus is
used as the measure of the corporation's right to purchase its own shares, such
surplus shall be restricted as long as such shares are held as treasury shares,
and upon the disposition or cancellation of any such shares the restriction shall
be removed pro tanto as to all of such restrictive surplus not eliminated
thereby. "
The requirement is that surplus be maintained until the purchased shares
are cancelled or disposed of otherwise. Once the shares are cancelled or disposed
of otherwise, the requirement for maintaining surplus is absolved. There is no
mention that a corporation must retain surplus until the date of payment, but
merely that it must have surplus on the date of purchase, and maintain that
surplus while such shares are held in the treasury. Clearly, article 2.03 (E)
permits the surplus requirement to be extinguished before cash leaves the
corporation. To require a corporation that has cancelled repurchased shares to
have a surplus when cash subsequently leaves the corporation as payment is
to disregard article 2.03 (E). Thus, the intent of the framers of the Model
Act in distinguishing prerequisites for purchases from prerequisites for pay-
ments carried through into article 2.03 (E). It appears to have been the in-
tent of article 2.03 that a corporation must have surplus on the date it
purchases its own shares, must maintain that surplus during the time the se-
"
6 MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac'r ANN. § 6, 5 1 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
" Herwitz, supra note 19, at 323.3 6Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03(E) (1956).
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curities are held in the treasury, and must be solvent, but need not have a
surplus on the date it makes a cash payment for those shares. If these argu-
ments seem academic, theoretical, and of little concern to the practicing at-
torney, concrete practical reasons are readily available to support the position
that the surplus limitations must be applied at the outset.
First, reason and sound business practice support treating the acquisition
as final on the date the share repurchase agreement is made and the shares
surrendered to the corporation, rather than leaving the repurchase contract
indefinitely open until cash leaves the corporation. Most repurchase-of-shares
agreements challenged under the common-law insolvency cutoff test were
deemed executory until cash left the corporation."5 Most decisions since the
modern repurchase-of-shares statutes have indiscriminately held repurchase
contracts executory until the payment in cash, even though on the date of exe-
cution of the agreement the shares were surrendered for cancellation, the
appropriate surplus account debited, and all shareholder rights and privileges
surrendered by the selling shareholder.' These latter decisions have failed to
consider provisions such as article 2.03(E) and the 1957 amendment to the
Model Act which infer that a repurchase contract is final on the purchase date
or on the date the repurchased shares are cancelled or disposed of otherwise,
whichever occurs last. Moreover, these decisions overlook the fact that a ne-
gotiable promissory note constitutes "payment" under the Texas Business
and Commerce Code.4 That is, if a promissory note is used to repurchase
shares, the purchase and payment occur simultaneously, thereby satisfying both
the surplus and insolvency tests of article 2.03 at the outset.' To require a
surplus on the date the note is paid is directly in conflict with the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code. Indeed, such an imposition would require surplus
in an amount twice the purchase price, since the appropriate surplus account
would be debited at the outset, and then required to exist again when cash
leaves the corporation to pay the note. Admittedly, article 2.61 (B) of the TBCA
expressly states that a promissory note is not payment or part payment for
shares of a corporation,' but, in context, this authority is virtually worthless
as support for the executory nature of repurchase contracts, since article 2.16
was intended to dictate the proper consideration for issuances of shares. Need-
less to say, corporations daily repurchase their own shares in exchange for
"See notes 22, 23 supra, and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Mountain States Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th
Cir. 1960), and text accompanying note 30 supra; In re Matthews Const. Co., 120 F. Supp.
818 (S.D. Cal. 1954), and text accompanying note 32 supra.
41 See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(44) (1968). See also note 42 infra.
42In a contract entered into pursuant to the Texas Business and Commerce Code, the
seller's rights in such object cease when value (§ 1.201(44)) passes from the purchaser
to the seller, and the seller's rights in and to the object sold continue only if a security in-
terest is retained (S 2.401). Thus, if shares of stock were treated like every other thing
under the Texas Business and Commerce Code, the seller's rights, interests, and privileges
in and to the shares cease when "value," e.g., a promissory note, is issued to the seller by
the purchaser. "Payment" occurs when "value" is transferred.
43 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.16(B) (1956), provides that, "Neither promissory
notes nor the promise of future services shall constitute payment or part payment for shares




promissory notes or debentures, and few would challenge such transactions as
illegal under article 2.16(B).
The fact situation in Palmer v. Justice" demonstrates the problems which
can result from decisions like Mountain State and Mathews. In that case,
shares of the common stock of Maxwell Electronics Corporation were sur-
rendered in 1963 and cancelled during 1964, at which time the surplus ac-
count of the company was reduced by an amount equal to the value of the
shares. The purchase price was represented by a promissory note of the cor-
poration due in 1966. If the court had applied article 2.03 of the TBCA as
required by Mountain State and Mathews, it would have required an amount
of surplus equal to twice the amount of the purchase price of the shares. In
1966, when the note matured, the corporation would have had to have surplus
available equal to the purchase price, despite the fact that the surplus had
already been reduced by that amount in 1964. Further, to require the company
to maintain surplus until 1966 after the repurchased shares had been cancelled
in 1964, would have been to ignore completely article 2.03 (E) of the TBCA.'
Also, the court would have to have held that the contract of repurchase entered
into in 1963 was executory until 1966 when the note was paid, notwithstand-
ing that the issuance of the negotiable promissory note constituted payment
under the Texas Business and Commerce Code, and that the selling share-
holders had relinquished in 1963 all rights and privileges as shareholders of
the corporation. Indeed, the court would have had to create a new type of
security holder, since between 1963 and 1966 the persons who had sold their
shares to Maxwell could not be categorized either as shareholders or creditors.
Such persons certainly were not shareholders, as they relinquished all voting
rights, appraisal rights, dividend rights, and all other rights and privileges in
their stock in 1963; and they could not be called full-fledged creditors, as their
notes were enforceable only when and if the corporation ever had surplus
equal to the purchase price. In this state of limbo, such persons might be
called "subordinated contingent creditors." The court in Palmer v. Justice cor-
rectly held that the purchase and payment were made in 1963, thereby avoid-
ing these problems.
Another problem with holding repurchase-of-shares agreements executory
until cash leaves the corporation, and with applying the surplus requirements
at that time, is the ease with which this impact can be avoided. To avoid de-
cisions such as Mountain State and Mathews, a corporation need only purchase
its own shares for cash, then have the former shareholder loan back to the
corporation the cash received. To fall squarely in line with Tracy, the note
should be secured. This preference of form over substance should find no com-
fort in this age of sophisticated corporate finance, and, therefore, some courts
have looked through the form to the substance of the transaction.' Yet this
distinction without a difference has not always been disallowed as a subterfuge,
" 322 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Tex.), afl'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1971).
" See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
" United States v. General Geophysical Co., 296 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 849 (1962).
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and the possibility that it may work has often driven counsel to recommend
the extra step.
Another problem in applying Mountain State, Mathews, and Robinson is
that insiders may lawfully and purposefully defraud minority shareholders
who have sold their shares to the corporation. In the commonplace situation
where a dissenting minority shareholder in a small corporation has been bought
out by the company, the corporation may purchase his shares for a promissory
note; the insiders could then vindictively proceed to insure that surplus was
never available to pay the note. This can be accomplished by the use of the
power to declare dividends in an amount equal to the available surplus, and
other perfectly legal methods of depleting surplus.
Other possible ramifications which can result from confusing the Robinson
doctrine with the requirements of the statutory surplus statutes are provided
by recent exchange offers. In 1968 and 1969 numerous corporations acquired
their own common stock from public shareholders and issued debentures in
exchange therefor. Under Mountain State and Mathews a court would be
constrained to hold, if surplus now did not exist equal to the purchase price of
the shares, that payment of interest on these debentures is unlawful, and that
the underlying obligations themselves are inferior to all other general creditors.
The inconsistency of the Robinson doctrine with modern business needs and
practices is clear.
The current Penn Central reorganization demonstrates the shortcomings of
incorporating the Robinson doctrine into modern repurchase-of-shares statutes.
Former shareholders in Penn Central may in the past have exchanged their
shares for debentures in the corporation when adequate surplus existed. The
trustee would now be compelled to pursue a labyrinth of transfers through
various financial portfolios to locate the present debentureholders. These deben-
tureholders would then be declared inferior to other creditors and the possessors
of contingent claims. It might be possible for these holders to pursue recovery
back through the chain of ownership to the original purchaser of the debenture,
but this avenue of recovery seems dim. It becomes once again painfully obvious
that the needs of modern business practice cannot bear the strictures which
the Mountain State and Mathews decisions impose. Negotiable instruments
and evidences of indebtedness must be allowed to flow freely.
Numerous other problems have been recognized and discussed in this area.
For example, accounting problems, treatment of treasury shares, and income
tax problems present potential pitfalls.47 All of these problems point to the
uncertain nature of the application of article 2.03 of the TBCA and the ap-
parent need for change.
IV. LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL REPURCHASES
If a Texas corporation wrongfully repurchases its own shares, statutory civil
liability is imposed by article 2.414" of the TBCA jointly and severally upon
the directors who voted for or assented to the transaction. The extent of lia-
47 See Herwitz, note 19 supra.
48TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41 (1956).
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bility can be either the amount of consideration paid for the shares in excess
of the maximum amount which could have been lawfully paid on the date of
purchase or the aggregate amount of payments made. 9 A director is exonerated
if he (1) dissents in writing to the repurchase, (2) acts in reliance upon
financial statements prepared by certain officers or accountants as to the
financial condition of the corporation, or (3) in good faith and in the exercise
of ordinary care relies on the written opinion of counsel to the corporation."'
Some protection is provided for liable directors who are entitled to contribution
from shareholders who knowingly accept illegal payments" and from other
directors who vote for or assent to the repurchase."2 Texas, like most states,
does not impose criminal liability for purchases in violation of the statute."
This civil liability imposed on directors by article 2.41 (A) (2) is deceivingly
narrow in coverage. First, the validity of a purchase by a corporation of its
own shares may be challenged only by persons who are injured, or whose
rights are prejudiced, and who have not approved the purchase.' This elimi-
nates, among others, as possible plaintiffs the corporation, shareholders who
voted for or are not prejudiced by the transaction, existing creditors not in-
jured, and subsequent creditors who become such with notice of the transaction.
Next, misconduct and negligence are penalized by the statute, but some viola-
tions may be covered by an indemnification bylaw."5 And, as mentioned above,
the assenting director who relies on certain financial statements of the cor-
poration or on an opinion of counsel is relieved of liability. Ironically, the
narrowness of article 2.41 is fortunate because of the number of repurchase
transactions that appear legal on their face, but violate article 2.03 as construed
by decisions such as Mountain State and Mathews. However, those transactions
which fall outside the coverage of article 2.41 may violate other laws, such
as the federal securities laws.
Grave consequences result from a wrongful repurchase of shares that in-
advertently violates the federal securities laws. The coverage of the federal
securities laws is daily growing so broad that, if the trend continues, few
4'Id. arts. 2.41 (A) (2), 2.41 (A) (6).
50Id. arts. 2.41(B), 2.41(C), 2.41(D).
1Id. art. 2.41 (E).
"Id. art. 2.41 (F).
"1Cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.35 (McKinney 1967), which makes it a misdemeanor
to repurchase shares wrongfully.
54Z. CAVITCH, supra note 27, § 147.06, at 869. The recent case of Triumph Smokes,
Inc. v. Sarlo, 482 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), provides an excellent ex-
ample of the narrowness of art. 2.41 of the TBCA. There, shareholders of Triumph Smokes
exchanged shares of the common stock of Triumph Smokes for debentures of Triumph
Smokes at a time when the corporation had no earned surplus. The debentures were unpaid
at the time of trial, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the deben-
ture holders. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision by holding that the
purchase by a corporation of its own shares in contravention of art. 2.03 of the TBCA is
not per se "illegal and void" but merely an act "without authority" and, therefore, voidable.
The court further held the debentures were enforceable; whether the debentures in this case
were in fact voidable was not decided, since the corporation cannot challenge the transaction.
That is, "The validity of the purchase may not be attacked by the corporation itself." Id.
at 698.
5TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A) (16) (1956) empowers a Texas corpora-
tion to indemnify certain persons except for negligence or misconduct in performance of
their duty to the corporation, and to provide further for indemnification in bylaws, agree-
ments, by a vote of shareholders, and otherwise.
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violations of article 2.41 (A) (2) may escape the ambit of the antifraud pro-
visions of the federal securities laws. For example, as a leading authority re-
garding rule lOb-5 liability notes, "A startling variety of everyday transactions
have turned out to be fraudulent under SEC Rule lOb-5."" Indeed, with the
attorney-client privilege' and the idemnification agreement" being whittled
away under the federal securities laws by federal courts and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, no one can safely predict the outer boundaries of the
federal securities laws.
If the federal securities laws continue to expand to such a degree as to cover
violations of article 2.41, state actions under article 2.41 will yield to federal
suits. The availability of a longer statute of limitation, nation-wide service of
process, exemption from state security for expense requirements, and other
significant procedural advantages under the federal securities laws heavily
favor an antifraud suit under some provision such as rule lOb-5 over any
state action." In addition, the common law elements of fraud have been less
stringently enforced or eliminated in 10b-5 suits, so that the burden of proof
may be easier to carry than under a state suit. Moreover, the defenses of re-
liance on financial statements or an opinion of counsel, or dissenting in writing
to the transaction, may not be available under rule lOb-5, but merely constitute
mitigating circumstances." Furthermore, under these laws the choice of defend-
ants is anything but narrow; not only would liability befall the director assent-
ing to a wrongful repurchase transaction, and possibly the participating share-
holder, but the accountant and attorney may also be drawn into the litigation."1
In and of itself, the dual coverage of article 2.41 and the federal antifraud
provisions should not be upsetting. In fact, under normal circumstances the
overlap would be beneficial to most parties involved in a repurchase transaction
as full disclosure of material facts would be a mere added prerequisite to such a
transaction. But court construction of statutes like article 2.03 which have
moved a number of apparently legitimate transactions into violations of
article 2.41 should be of concern if these transactions are also automatically
deemed breaches of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. A
violation of article 2.41 is a far cry from a violation of the federal securities
laws, which provide not only civil liability but criminal liability, larger re-
coveries, and injunctions from future dealings in securities." Thus, the par-
"A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 3.
" SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3,
1972). In this action the Securities and Exchange Commission has charged, among other
things, that certain attorneys were under a duty to notify the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission concerning the misleading nature of financial statements of the attorneys' client.
" Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970).
"A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 15.
"For example, see SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
where it was found that the registration provisions of the Securities Act were violated, but
an injunction was denied since the defendants had relied in part on the advice of counsel
that the transactions were legal.
6 See note 57 supra. For a discussion of the allegations in this case against the attorneys
and accountants involved, see 5 THE REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 913 (1972).
2 The arsenal of remedies and possible actions against persons violating the federal se-
curities laws is awesome. In addition to statutory provisions for civil and criminal liability
and injunctive relief, the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to its rule-making
authority, has promulgated additional remedies. For example, rule 10b-5 has become by
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ticipants in a share repurchase transaction that violated article 2.41 because
the surplus requirements of article 2.03 were applied at the time cash left the
corporation rather than when the repurchase agreement was executed or a
promissory note was exchanged for shares, would face extremely severe sanc-
tions under the federal securities laws. Surely these participants should not
pay for the shortcomings of decisions such as Mountain State and Mathews.
This analysis demonstrates the need for eliminating the problems inherent in
article 2.03 by new legislation before seemingly legal repurchase transactions
which presently violate only state statutes by reason of erroneous decisions
are challenged under more harsh federal antifraud provisions such as rule 10b-5.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT
To alleviate the problems caused by the imposition of the surplus require-
ments at the time cash leaves the corporation, amendments to the TBCA are
necessary. In the following proposed amendments the italicized portions repre-
sent the proposed changes to existing statutes.
Article 2.16 would be amended to provide that:
Neither promissory notes nor the promise of further services shall con-
stitute payment or part payment for the issuance of shares of a corporation.
Article 2.03 (F) would read:
No purchase or payment for its own shares shall be consummated at the
time when there are reasonable grounds for believing that the corporation
is insolvent, or would be rendered insolvent by such purchase or payment
or when, after such purchase or payment, the fair market value of its total
assets will be less than the total amount of its debts.
A new paragraph H would be added to article 2.03:
(1) As used in this Article, the term "purchase" means the taking by sale,
discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or reissue, gift or
any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.
(2) As used in this Article, the term "payment" means the giving of
value consisting of:
(a) money paid, labor done, or property actually delivered;
(b) a binding commitment to deliver cash, perform services, or de-
liver property at a time certain in the future;
(c) a promise or covenant to perform or refrain from performing at
a time certain in the future;
(d) the collection or compromise of indebtedness owed; or
(e) generally, any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract.
far the most popular provision of the federal securities laws under which to seek almost
any type of relief. See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 1. Another example is SEC Rules
of Practice 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1972), which provides that any attorney, account-
ant or other professional expert who has been permanently enjoined on the basis of a se-
curities law violation may be ordered to show cause why he should not be censored or
temporarily or permanently disqualified from practicing before the SEC.
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To support the amendments and show clearly their intent, the comment should
provide that:
The addition of the language "or payment for" to paragraph F of Article
2.03 of the TBCA is intended to insure that the insolvency limitation is
applied to both date of purchase and date of payment while the surplus
restrictions are applied only at date of purchase. Paragraph H of Article
2.03 of the TBCA specifies the times the surplus restrictions and the in-
solvency provision apply. Both the surplus requirements and insolvency
tests must be satisfied on the date of "purchase," while only the insolvency
tests, and not the surplus requirement, must be met on the date of "pay-
ment." The addition to paragraph F and new paragraph H make a re-
purchase of shares contract final on the date value leaves the corporation.
Thereby, a selling shareholder, who receives value in the form of a promis-
sory note or debenture, or otherwise delays receipt of cash for shares sold
to the corporation, succeeds to the status of a general creditor of the cor-
poration in that he does not assume the risk that the corporation will
have insufficient surplus in the future to cover the price remaining to be
paid on his instrument of indebtedness; he only assumes the risk that the
corporation will not become bankrupt.
Under the proposed amendments, creditor protection would be as well served
when a corporation purchases its own shares as when a corporation distributed
dividends or assets in partial liquidation. These three transactions were origin-
ally intended to be treated similarly, as each involves a distribution of assets
available to pay creditors. Over-generous courts have upset the scheme in
favor of creditors by disregarding the intent of the drafters of the surplus
statutes, relying on outdated precedent effectively overruled by passage of
modern business corporation acts and refusing to consider the consequences
that spring from their decisions. This state of confusion has existed too long
and must be eliminated by legislation similar to that proposed.
VI. PLANNING PENDING CHANGE
There is no dearth of reasons why the surplus requirements of article 2.03
should apply only on the date of purchase and not when money leaves the cor-
poration as payment for the shares, why a repurchase contract should be final
on the date shares are surrendered and value leaves the corporation, why de-
cisions such as Robinson should be distinguished, and why decisions such as
Mountain State and Mathews should be overruled. While waiting for these
changes, the corporation cannot disregard the variety of legitimate business
reasons and circumstances which prompt it to purchase its own shares, just as
it cannot give up the leverage when a corporation defers expending cash for
repurchased shares. Thus, pending amendment to the TBCA or change in
most courts' attitudes, it is necessary to plan around Robinson, Mountain State,
and Mathews.
The success of some efforts to avoid the fortuitous application of the surplus
requirements depends to a large extent on the jurisdiction. For example, in the
Fifth Circuit the exchange of cash and corporate properties for shares, followed
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a few hours later by the corporation repurchasing the properties for notes
secured by assets of the corporation, has been labelled a subterfuge. In United
States v. General Geophysical Co." counsel carefully and specifically planned
to avoid the holding of Robinson, but not all of the steps of counsel's plan
were carried out and documented. Therefore, the court held that the form of
the transaction merely tried to disguise the substance of an exchange of a
promissory note for shares, which under Robinson required application of the
surplus requirements on the date cash left the corporation to pay the note.
On the other hand, in Minnesota, a transaction in which promissory notes
secured by chattel mortgages were issued in exchange for repurchased shares
was final on the date the notes were issued."' In that case the form of the
contract was decisive. Probably a cash repurchase followed by a loan-back will
work in Texas if (1) there is no prior agreement to loan-back the purchase
price, (2) there is a sufficient break in time to divorce the purchase from the
loan-back, and (3) the cash is actually delivered or the check representing
the cash has time to clear the bank before the loan-back.
A planning device that should work, but which failed to clear the surplus
requirements hurdle the one time it was challenged, is the use of a dummy
corporation as a nominee purchaser of the shares. In Kleinberg v. Schwartz"
the dummy corporation had no assets, and funds representing the purchase
price were deposited by the original corporation directly in the account of the
selling shareholder without passing through the dummy. Again, the plan failed
because prescribed steps were not carried out. If a subsidiary or affiliate cor-
poration purchases the shares for a promissory note, the surplus requirements
can be forgotten. Subsequently, the parent can merge the subsidiary or affiliate
into itself if it is imperative that the purchased shares be retired.
For the corporation that desires to repurchase some of its own shares for
other than cash or tangible assets, these other suggestions may be helpful:
1. If a promissory note is used as the purchase price, it should be negoti-
able and secured by mortgages on tangible assets." Repurchased shares
should not collateralize the note.
2. Repurchased shares should be forthwith cancelled or otherwise dis-
posed of."7
3. When possible, shareholder approval should be obtained."8
4. Existing and future creditors should be made cognizant of the trans-
action."
5. Contractual obligations to pay for shares in the future should be
'1296 F.2d 86 (5th Cit. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962).
'
4 Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967).
5 87 N.J. Super. 216, 208 A.2d 803 (App. Div.), certification granted, 45 N.J. 33,
210 A.2d 779, aff'd per curiam, 46 N.J. 2, 214 A.2d 313 (1965).
""See text accompanying note 34 supra.
" If repurchased shares are cancelled, some weight must be given under TEX. Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.03(E) (1956) to the argument that the surplus requirement is
absolved upon cancellation of such shares.
""In a publicly held corporation, the cost of solicitation of proxies may be prohibitive.
However, in the close corporation, the consent of shareholders will, at the minimum, elimi-
nate a class of possible plaintiffs.
"'Borst v. East Coast Shipyards, Inc., 105 N.Y.S.2d 228, 233 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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evidenced by a promissory note rather than left as a mere contractual
liability.
6. A corporate promissory note received by a shareholder in exchange for
shares should be discounted as soon as possible or otherwise put into
the flow of commerce.
7. An operating subsidiary or affiliate of the corporation should be the
nominee purchaser if possible, but a mere shell or dummy corporation
could be fatal.
8. Buy-sell arrangements funded with life insurance should be between
shareholders, not between shareholders and the corporation.
